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Kurzfassung
Vorbemerkung
In diesem Bericht wird versucht, die Entwicklung der russischen Außenpolitik von ihrer klar pro-
westlichen Ausrichtung  in  den  Jahren  1991-1992  zu  einer  ausgewogeneren und  nationali-
stischeren Version in der Mitte der neunziger Jahre nachzuzeichnen und zu analysieren. Dazu 
sollen einige Ausblicke in die Zukunft gemacht werden.
Ergebnisse
1. Die Außenpolitik  des neuen Rußland war in vieler Hinsicht eine Fortsetzung des Gorba-
tschowschen "neuen Denkens".  Gorbatschow beseitigte das  militärische und  politische 
Erbe des Stalinismus-Breshnewismus und lenkte so die Sowjetunion auf den Weg der 
Partnerschaft mit dem westlichen Bündnis. Diese Strategie fand volle Unterstützung bei der 
von Jelzin angeführten demokratischen Bewegung.
2. Nach ihrem Machtantritt distanzierten sich die Demokraten jedoch von Gorbatschows "neuem 
Denken".  Sie  argumentierten,  Gorbatschow habe  weiterhin  "die  Welt  in  zwei  Lager 
geteilt", sie hingegen hätten vor, "eine völlig neue Politik uneingeschränkter Partnerschaft 
und Integration mit dem Westen" einzuleiten. Tatsächlich wurde diese Politik auch betrie-
ben, denn die russischen Demokraten sahen in den westlichen Staaten ihre hauptsächlichen 
ideologischen und politischen Verbündeten, die Hauptquelle für wirtschaftliche Hilfe und 
ein Modell für die Entwicklung Rußlands.
3. Die Förderung von Bindungen zu den - nunmehr unabhängigen - ehemaligen Sowjetrepu-
bliken wurde ein weiteres neues Element der  russischen Diplomatie.  Jelzin und seine 
Mannschaft  glaubten,  daß  die  Auflösung  der  UdSSR  und  die  Zerschlagung  des 
Kommunismus große Aussichten für wahre Freundschaft und fruchtbare Zusammenarbeit 
unter den neuen Nachbarn eröffnet habe.
4. Schließlich entledigte man sich des kommunistischen Erbes. Moskau ließ den Willen erken-
nen, historische Schandtaten der UdSSR einzugestehen und zu korrigieren. Die demokrati-
sche Regierung reduzierte ihre Aktivitäten in Osteuropa und distanzierte sich ebenso von 
den verbliebenen kommunistischen Regimen und den radikalen Freunden der UdSSR in 
der Dritten Welt. Von diesen zeigte sich (aus verschiedenen Gründen) niemand sehr erpicht 
auf Zusammenarbeit mit dem neuen Rußland.
5. Mit der Zeit begannen mehrere innere und äußere Faktoren auf Jelzins ursprüngliche Strategie 
einzuwirken.  Im Innern hatte  das Scheitern der "Schocktherapie" die Schwächung der 
Demokraten und die Stärkung der Kommunisten und Nationalisten zur Folge. Konservati-
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ver Druck auf die Außenpolitik geht nicht nur von der Opposition aus, sondern auch von 
innerhalb der umgebildeten Regierung.
6. Nach außen ist Rußland enttäuscht vom Verhalten des Westens: Dieser ist nicht zu einem 
verläßlichen ideologischen und politischen Verbündeten geworden, die Hilfe ist begrenzt, 
und das westliche Modell scheint auf russischem Boden nicht zu funktionieren. Auch die 
Beziehungen zu den ehemaligen Sowjetrepubliken haben sich als dornenreich erwiesen. Es 
kam  zu  Kontroversen  um  die  russische  Diaspora,  die  Aufteilung  von  Eigentum, 
willkürliche Grenzen usw. Der russische Rückzug aus Osteuropa und anderen Teilen der 
Welt brachte deutliche Verluste mit sich (wirtschaftlicher, geopolitischer und kultureller 
Art sowie Prestigeverlust).
7. Die Außenpolitik von Jelzin und Kosyrew wurde zum Gegenstand von Kritik, die sich zu 
einer  umfassenden  nationalen  Debatte  auswuchs.  Die  Beteiligten  an  dieser  Debatte 
spalteten sich in vier größere Lager auf. Das erste von ihnen, die Westler, tritt nach wie vor 
für die Hauptaspekte der ursprünglichen Strategie ein. Das entgegengesetzte Lager sieht im 
Westen einen ewigen Feind Rußlands und  schlägt  vor,  der  vermeintlichen westlichen 
Bedrohung durch Bündnisse - mit den GUS-Staaten, dem Iran oder China - zu begegnen. 
Des weiteren gibt es Kreise, die auf der ganzen Welt Feinde Rußlands sehen und nach einer 
massiven Verteidigung des Vaterlands rufen. Das vierte Lager, dem viele Demokraten und 
Zentristen angehören, tritt für eine ausgewogenere außenpolitische Strategie ein, die offen 
und kooperativ ist, aber ohne pro-westliche "Schieflage". Was die russische Öffentlichkeit 
angeht,  so  sind  deren  Ansichten  fließend  und  instabil.  Im  Allgemeinen  folgt  die 
Öffentlichkeit nach wie vor der Meinung der politischen Führer (wie es seit alters her 
Tradition ist).
8. Infolge der äußeren und inneren Einflüsse und insbesondere der nationalen Debatten werden 
die  anfänglichen  Motive  der  neuen  russischen  Außenpolitik  allmählich  modifiziert. 
Rußland legt wieder Gewicht auf Sicherheit, starke Streitkräfte, Auslandsaufklärung und 
das Schmieden strategischer Partnerschaften in verschiedenen Regionen. Nationalismus 
findet  seinen Ausdruck  im Schutz  der  russischen Diaspora,  in  der  Glorifizierung der 
imperialen Vergangenheit Rußlands und in der Minderung der Rolle der Reuebekundung 
für  die  Untaten  des  kommunistischen Regimes.  Die  Supermachtambitionen Rußlands 
lassen sich in den zunehmenden Ansprüchen erkennen, die zentrale Rolle im gesamten 
Bereich der ehemaligen Sowjetunion zu spielen, dem exklusiven Klub der "G7" beizutreten 
und die russische Flagge auf allen vier Kontinenten zu zeigen. Demokratische Ideen haben 
keinen  Einfluß  mehr  auf  die  Beziehungen  des  Kreml  zu  anderen  Staaten,  dagegen 
ermutigen wirtschaftliche Interessen Moskau, die Zusammenarbeit mit vielen Ländern der 
Dritten Welt wieder aufzunehmen.
9. Die revidierte Gesamtstrategie Rußlands hat noch nicht ihre endgültige Gestalt angenommen. 
Es scheint sich aber  innerhalb der Gesellschaft ein gewisser Konsens herauszubilden. Im 
Wesentlichen geht er dahin, daß die russische Diplomatie weniger pro-westlich ausgerichtet 
sein  soll,  dafür  mehr  Ausgewogenheit,  Sicherheitsbewußtsein,  Supermachtorientierung, 
wirtschaftliche Motivation und Pragmatismus an den Tag legen sollte. Das "nahe Ausland" 
wird das diplomatische Tagesgeschehen Rußlands beherrschen, aber der Weg zur Integration, 
wie immer diese aussehen mag, wird steinig sein. Bilaterale und internationale Differenzen 
werden Moskaus Partnerschaft mit dem Westen beeinträchtigen. Aber die Partnerschaft wird 
überdauern. Beide Seiten verfügen weder über ausreichende Gründe noch über die Mittel, um 
zum Kollisionskurs zurückzukehren. Daneben ist ein energischeres russisches Vorgehen im 
asiatisch-pazifischen Raum, im Nahen Osten und in Südasien zu erwarten. Insgesamt wird 
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Rußland höchstwahrscheinlich eines der Kraftzentren in der entstehenden multipolaren Welt 
sein, und sein Verhalten wird sich nicht durch größere Aggressivität oder sonstige Eigenheiten 
auszeichnen als das der anderen.
Part I. The Origins
Moscow's foreign policy is once again undergoing a noticeable change. To understand the rea-
sons for this change, its contents and prospects, one has to, first of all, go back to the origins of 
the foreign policy of the new Russian state. The policy began taking shape following Russia's 
emergence as a  sovereign and independent state - in 1991  after the defeat of the communist 
regime and subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus.
1.1 Gorbachev's legacy
In many ways the foreign policy of the new Russia was the continuation of Gorbachev's "new 
thinking". Mikhail Gorbachev devoted himself to the dismantling of the Stalinist-Brezhnevist 
system. The reformation of Moscow's behavior in the international arena became part of this 
process.1 The Soviet Union was set on the path of rapprochement and even partnership with the 
Western alliance through the clearing away of the military and political legacy of Stalinism-
Brezhnevism.2 Within the framework of such a strategy the Kremlin drastically transformed its 
approaches to disarmament, European security and the unification of Germany. The changing 
view of the West as well as the evolution of the Soviet ideology, mounting economic and other 
internal pressures led to the reversal of the former Moscow's policies vis-a-vis other communist 
countries, the international communist movement and Third World nations. Gorbachev allowed 
East  European allies to go their  own ways,  made peace with China,  withdrew troops from 
Afghanistan, stopped the unqualified support of traditional allies in Asia, the Middle East, Africa 
and Latin America. In short, the USSR voluntarily ceased to be a communist empire locked in an 
ideological and geopolitical confrontation with the West and instead concentrated on becoming a 
good partner of the West, sharing with it many values and working together on solving pressing 
international and global issues.3 Gorbachev did not expect the traditional Soviet adversaries to 
make similar gigantic changes in their behavior (after all, it was the USSR which had decided to 
reform its own ways). However, the Soviet leader did hope that the USA and its allies would 
agree to the new world order based on changed realities. There was plenty of evidence that the 
West was moving in the right direction (though not as fast as the Kremlin desired).4
Gorbachev's "new thinking" was rejected in various degrees or even totally by many Communist 
party and military-industrial complex functionaries. Perceiving the West as hostile to the USSR, 
they characterized Gorbachev's foreign policy as detrimental to the state interests. Their attitudes 
originated in hurt super-power ambitions, traditional national security fears, disturbed ideological 
dogmas and deep-rooted cultural prejudices.5 The nationalist parties which had begun emerging 
as the Soviet Union became more democratic also resented the Kremlin's line in international 
affairs.6 However, the "new thinking" enjoyed full support of the majority of the democratic 
1 See M. Gorbachev, O glavnykh napravleniyakh vnytrennei i vneshnei politiki SSSR. Rech na syezde narod-
nykh deputatov 30 Maya 1989, Moscow, Politizdat, 1989, pp. 4-8.
2 See M. Gorbachev, Zhizn i reformy, kniga II, Moscow, Novosti, 1995.
3 Ibid.
4 See the discussion of such a movement by the Western nations in Ya. Plyas, Rossiya i mir na poroge XXI 
veka, Moscow, Izdatelstvo Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta kommertsii, 1995, pp. 8-11.
5 For a detailed insight into such attitudes see Materialy XXVII syezda KPSS, Moscow, Politizdat, 1990.
6 For a review on this subject see Eugene Rumer, Russian National Security and Foreign Policy in Transition, 
Santa Monica, Rand, 1995, pp. 1-10.
forces in the country, including the most powerful source of domestic opposition to Gorbachev - 
the " Democratic Russia" movement, headed by the President of the Russian republic, Boris 
Yeltsin.7
Criticizing  the  Soviet  leader  for  his  conservative  shift  in  internal  affairs  in  the  winter  of 
1990-1991  democrats at  the same time actively participated in the development of the new 
agenda  of  Moscow's  diplomacy.  In  turn,  Gorbachev's  advisers  in  the  foreign  affairs  field 
progressively leaned towards the  democratic  and towards Yeltsin's side. Among them were 
Foreign  Minister  Eduard  Shevardnadze,  "perestroika's"  ideologist,  Alexander  Yakovlev, 
academics  Yevgeni  Primakov,  Oleg  Bogomolov,  Georgi  Arbatov,  Yuri  Ryzhov,  Andrei 
Kokoshin and many others. In addition to Gorbachev's platform, the radical wing of democrats 
around Yeltsin openly called for dismantling the Soviet internal empire and making it a union of 
equal  partners.  Thus,  they  intended  to  undermine  the  influence  of  the  union  center  and 
Gorbachev personally (which they finally succeeded in). Yet, the President of the USSR could 
not resist the trend and advocated greater freedoms for the union republics and a new union treaty 
himself (the decision which triggered a conservative coup d'etat in August 1991).8
1.2 The Western connection
Though Gorbachev's legacy had a strong impact on the foreign policy of the new Russia, Russian 
leaders nevertheless tried hard to dissociate themselves from the recent past. In their first ap-
pearance before the staff members of the former Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in December 
1991 Yeltsin's then right-hand man State Secretary Gennadi Burbulis and Foreign Minister An-
drei Kozyrev categorically denied any connection with Gorbachev. Burbulis said: "The previous 
authorities continued to divide the world into two camps, socialist and capitalist.  They still 
believed in the construction of the so-called communist society as something superior to the 
Western model. Such an attitude automatically produced a ground for new confrontations and 
rivalry." Kozyrev stressed that the democratic Russia was about to initiate "a completely fresh 
policy of unrestrained partnership and integration with the West".9
Indeed, such a strategy was launched. The democratic forces which came to power in 1991 were 
eager to build a brand-new, free and prosperous Russia, and all their hopes rested on the West. 
The  West  seemed to  be  their  principle  ideological  and  political  ally.  Back  in  1991-1992, 
Burbulis, Poltoranin, Gaidar, Chubais, Kozyrev and other key members of Yeltsin's team stressed 
that Russia should concentrate its attention on the USA, Western Europe, and Japan. These "rich, 
developed,  civilized  countries  were  indispensable  for  the  economic,  spiritual,  political 
resurrection of Russia".10 To turn away from the West, insisted the new Kremlin occupants, 
would mean loosing a precious opportunity and leaving Russia as "the sick man of Europe".11 
Yeltsin repeatedly declared that Russia and the USA shared "mutual  interests"12 and enjoyed 
"stable and well-regulated relations based on partnership"13 thus rendering "parity in nuclear 
strength unnecessary". In his speech at the session of the UN Security Council on January 31, 
1992 President Yeltsin emphasized the fact that Russia "considered the United States and other 
7 See A. Kozyrev, Preobrazhenie, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1995.
8 M. Gorbachev, Zhizn..., op. cit., especially pp. 493-602.
9 The author of this article participated in that event and took notes.
10 See Izvestiya,  27  September 1991;  Megapolis  Express,  7 October  1992;  Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn,  1993, 
No. 2, pp. 5-22; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 August 1992; Novoe Vremya, No. 23, 1992.
11 Andrei Kozyrev, Preobrazhenie ili Kafkianskaya metamorfoza, in: Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 August 1992.
12 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 April 1993.
13 RIA, 14 January 1994.
Western countries not only as partners but as allies".14 Yeltsin explained that Moscow now shared 
basic foreign policy principles with the West:  "Supremacy of democratic human rights and 
freedoms, legality and morals".15 The priority of the West in Russia's diplomacy was also justified 
by the  necessity to  reduce and  eliminate  strategic  nuclear  weapons and  solve other  major 
international problems.16
Perhaps the fact that  the West openly sided with Yeltsin and his democratic camp in their 
struggle with internal foes was even more significant. Shortly before the August 1991 coup pro-
Yeltsin Moscow Mayor Popov secretly appealed to the American ambassador for help.17 Upon 
dissolution of the USSR it was President Bush whom Yeltsin telephoned first to ask for blessings 
(Gorbachev learned about the decision only later).18
In 1993 Yeltsin sent a message to the West requesting support for his struggle against the par-
liament.19 Many members of the Russian democratic movement felt that the Western connection 
guarded the new Russia  from the comeback of the internal  reactionary forces. Kozyrev for 
instance argued that the strategic partnership with the West in itself would encourage and fa-
cilitate democratic development in Russia. Because of this Kozyrev recommended not to put too 
much  emphasis  on  an  "aggressive  policy  of  defending  national  interests  in  relations  with 
partners".20
The West was also considered the main source of aid, urgently needed for successful reforms. 
The Western community had the necessary material and financial potential and seemed to be 
ready to share it with the new Russia. At least in the beginning of 1992 all branches of the 
Russian government subscribed to the view that the formation of an effective, dynamically de-
veloping Russian economy and the promotion of access to the world markets for national in-
dustry and national business as a whole had become.21 Even Parliament Speaker Ruslan Khasbu-
latov, who later turned into a bitter opponent of Kozyrev's line, said at that time: "In relations 
with the outside world we should give priority to those states, with whom cooperation in the best 
way possible... can help us to create a real state potential."22
Kozyrev, singling out the United States as the main target of Russian foreign policy, explained 
that only in relying on this "leading Western country and our biggest Eastern neighbor" could 
Moscow achieve its goals vis-a-vis G7, the IMF and in fact the whole world".23 Gaidar for his part 
tried to convince both Russians and Westerners that in order to develop a market economy and to 
overcome the threat of the conservative revanche in Russia access to external sources of finance 
and  integration  into  the  global  division of  production,  consumption,  trade  and  labor  were 
necessary.24
14 Rossiyskaya gazeta, 31 January 1992. On the same subject see Yeltsin's report on the UN Security Council's 
proceedings in the Russia's Supreme Soviet delivered on 13 February 1992 (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 14 February 
1992); Kozyrev's remarks in the UN human rights Commission (Izvestiya, 13 February 1992).
15 Rossiyskaya gazeta, 31 January 1992.
16 Yeltsin's statement quoted in Rossiyskaya gazeta, January 20, 1993.
17 Izvestiya, 20 July 1993.
18 Komsomolskaya pravda, 15 May 1994.
19 Peter Shearman, Russian Policy Toward Western Europe: The German Axis, in: Russian Foreign Policy Since 
1990, ed. Peter Shearman, Boulder, Westview Press, 1995, p. 99.
20 Andrei Kozyrev, The Lagging Partnership, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3, 1994, p. 62.
21 See Proceedings of the conference "Transfigurated Russia in the New World", where most Russian leaders 
took the floor (Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, 1992, No. 3-4).
22 Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, 1992, No. 3-4, p. 88.
23 International Affairs, 1993, No. 2, p. 6.
24 Rossiyskaya gazeta, 12 April 1992.
Russia's democrats also saw the West as a model of development. They wanted to westernize 
Russia and, as Kozyrev put it in 1991, "to achieve the historical task of transforming Russia from 
the dangerous sick  giant  of Eurasia  into  a  member of the Western zone of co-prosperity". 
Kozyrev called upon compatriots "to learn from the advanced club how to live in a civilized 
way". To achieve this aim Kozyrev proposed: "We should prepare and implement joint programs 
of  reforms regarding the  economy,  security  and conversion with  the  direct  participation of 
Western experts at all stages".25 In 1993 "the Choice of Russia", then still a government party, 
connected personally to  Yeltsin,  stated  in  its  program:  "We consider developed democratic 
countries as natural partners and allies of Russia... We feel it to be very useful to join the Western 
security system".26
At that time V. Lukin, a prominent parliamentarian and later one of the leaders of the "Yabloko" 
party, which became the chief democratic opposition to Yeltsin and Kozyrev, also insisted that 
Moscow's overall priority was to enter the "new European home".27 It was repeatedly stressed by 
top officials that Russia's vital interests made it absolutely necessary to join the economic and 
political community of the West and to become part of Europe.28
Driven by the above-mentioned motives, Russia conducted a clearly pro-Western policy. The 
West was consulted and listened to on internal matters. Moscow went out of its way to be co-
operative, to approve the actions and positions of Western governments, and to follow a similar, 
if not identical, line in international affairs (for instance, in the Middle East, towards former 
Yugoslavia, North Korea, Cuba etc).29
1.3 The "Near Abroad"
The promotion of friendly ties with former Soviet republics - now independent states - became the 
second component of the new Russia's foreign policy.  Yeltsin and his democratic entourage 
welcomed the dissolution of the USSR not only because it was the only way to unseat Gor-
bachev. The concept of abandoning the imperial heritage enjoyed widespread grass-roots support 
in the country for a number of reasons. The democratic parties and liberal intelligentsiya felt that 
the democratization made the collapse of the USSR inevitable. To resist it meant conflicts and 
wars  equivalent  to  the  Yugoslavian  scenario.30 Another  argument  was  that  without  giving 
freedom to other peoples Russia would never become a normal, democratic state. Finally, Gaidar 
and other West-oriented economists in the government took the position that the union republics 
had become an economic burden and an unsurmountable obstacle to the reforms. Gaidar kept on 
stressing that  subsidies  to  the  republics,  accommodating  their  material  needs and  caprices 
destroyed any hope for the success of his tight-monetary policy. Instead, Kremlin reformers 
recommended rebuilding ties with the former republics on the basis of mutual profitability.31 At 
that time it was believed in Moscow that the newly independent republics would be grateful to 
Russia for the freedom it  had granted them, and that this together with shared political and 
25 Moscow News, 29 September 1991.
26 Predvybornaya programma Vybora Rossii, Moscow, Politika, 1993, pp. 4-5.
27 Moscow News, 10 February 1991.
28 Proceedings of the meetings of the Foreign Policy Council of the RFM in November and December 1992 
(Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, 1993, No. 2, pp. 5-22; see also V. Chernov, Natsionalnye interesy Rossii i ugrozy 
ee bezopasnosti, in: Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 April 1993).
29 For a Western assessment of this policy see, for example, ed. Peter Shearman, Russian Foreign Policy, op. 
cit., pp. 71-134, 267-302.
30 Izvestiya, 2 January 1992.
31 Reformy, Moscow, Nauchnaya kniga, 1995, p. 29-30.
economic values would enable the former union members to cooperate in building a better future 
(without tying each other's hands as might have been the case had the USSR continued to exist).32 
In addition, there was the clear expectation that Russia, as the most powerful state, would be 
accepted as the natural leader among equals.33
Many Russian policy-makers, as well as ordinary Russians, also held a naive and sentimental 
perception as to the degree of which other nationalities longed for continued association.34 On a 
more rational level, the Russian leadership assumed that integration impulses would be strong 
due to close economic links, the united military base and similar diplomatic tasks of the former 
Soviet republics.35 Besides, the new Russian leaders shared a history of opposition to the Soviet 
system and the Communist party with most of the other young governments. Even if there were 
manifestations of hostility towards Russia and Russians in some newly-born states, they were 
interpreted in the Kremlin as being directed at the old regime and consequently temporary in 
nature.36 Leaders in Moscow came to the definite conclusion that the disintegration of the Soviet 
republics would stop: "The period of emotional euphoria because of political independence will 
quickly pass and a new period of mutual gravitation will start".37 To assure such a process, as 
Kozyrev believed, it  was sufficient to build relations with the newly independent countries " 
based on principles successfully tested in Europe - non-violability and openness of borders, 
human rights and minority rights as well as mutually beneficial cooperation".38 At the beginning 
of 1992 Kozyrev argued that "ideas of unity of our peoples (peoples of the former USSR -Ye.B.) 
are already being filled with substance; agreements have been achieved regarding the united 
defense and the united strategic-military sphere and the framework for social  and economic 
interactions is taking shape". The Russian Foreign Minister called for "continued efforts to build 
on the achieved".39
All in all, the new Russian government had no intention of abandoning the "post-Soviet sphere" 
as something unimportant and burdensome (as critics claim now). On the contrary, right from the 
start the Kremlin, and the Foreign Minister in particular, stressed that relations with the former 
republics were "the main priority" and that  Russia  had "vital  interests" regarding the entire 
territory of the defunct Soviet Union.40
1.4 Overcoming the Soviet heritage
The third element of the foreign policy of Russia's democratic leadership was a rejection of the 
heritage of the communist Soviet Union. Moscow displayed a readiness for self-criticism, for the 
admission of historical misdeeds and a willingness to correct them through concessions or other 
methods.  The  Kremlin  expressed penitence for  the  invasions  of  Hungary,  Czechoslovakia, 
Afghanistan, annexation of the Baltic republics, domination over East Germany, manipulation of 
"liberation movements" and communist parties throughout the globe, shooting down a  South 
32 Perspektivy evraziyskoi integratsii, Moscow, Print, 1994, especially pp. 59-61.
33 Ibid., pp. 54-55.
34 Ibid., pp. 45-48.
35 See, for example, Kontseptsiya obyedineniya vooruzhennykh sil  otsenivaetsya, in:  Izvestiya, 31 December 
1991.
36 Perspektivy..., op. cit., pp. 59-61.
37 Ya. Plyas, Rossiya i..., op. cit., p. 62.
38 Moscow News, 16 February 1991.
39 Izvestiya, 2 January 1992.
40 Ibid. See also Ya. Plyas, ... op. cit., p. 91.
Korean aircraft in 1983, mistreatment of the Japanese P.O.W.'s in the late 1940s, spying against 
the West, and numerous other mistakes and crimes.
There were definite changes in Russia's policies vis-a-vis Eastern Europe, remaining communist 
regimes and  communist  parties  as  well  as  countries  of  the  Third  World.  Some observers, 
including Western ones, claim that Eastern Europe became "the region of forgotten neighbors of 
Russia",41 that Moscow adopted a policy of "benign neglect" and made little effort in developing a 
comprehensive policy regarding the  region as  a  whole.42 One  certainly  can  agree  with  the 
argument that Moscow, even back in the late-Gorbachev period, decided against retaining the 
"outer  empire" because  of  political,  economic and  strategic  considerations:  "No longer  did 
Moscow want to keep the West at a distance; instead it wished to draw closer and become a 
respected member of the world community; under those circumstances the East European buffer 
looked an increasingly costly encumbrance to improved relations with the West".43
However, as we see it, the main rationale for the change in Moscow's policy regarding Eastern 
Europe was  the  fact,  that  the  communist  regimes there  were rejected as  much  as  Russian 
democrats rejected the domestic communist regime. It did not mean that Russia lost interest in 
Eastern Europe, it rather wanted to deal with reformed neighbors, and felt the cooperation could 
work well with them. President Yeltsin himself repeatedly talked about the continuing strategic 
importance of Eastern Europe, implying an active Russian role there.44 What happened, though, 
was that  the East  European nations themselves, like released prisoners, scattered in various 
directions as soon as the doors of the Soviet empire were suddenly opened wide before them.45 
Under such circumstances it was hardly possible to conduct a successful policy in that region.
As for the communist states - North Korea, Cuba, Vietnam - they also did not display enthusiasm 
concerning the events in  Russia,  but  for  different reasons. They were shocked by the anti-
communist posture of the new Russian leaders and feared that  the "democratic fever" could 
penetrate their own turf by the way of example or through determined efforts of the Russian 
democrats. Moscow on its part consciously broke all ideological links and terminated special 
relations with the remaining communist states, among other things expecting their early demise. 
The Kremlin joined Western nations in the condemnation of human rights violations in Cuba and 
North Korea.46 The relations between the new Russian state and China also did not start in a 
particularly  auspicious  way  either.  Victorious  Russian  democrats  despised  the  Chinese 
communist regime because of the Tiananmen massacre of the local  democrats in 1989  and 
Beijing's support of the pro-communist coup in Moscow in August 1991. Chinese authorities, as 
other communist regimes, feared Moscow's interference in the internal affairs of the People's 
Republic of China.47
41 Mike Bowker, Russian Polity Toward Central and Eastern Europe, in: ed. Peter Shearman, Russian Foreign 
Policy ... op. cit., p. 71.
42 F. Stephen Larrabee, East Central Europe, in: ed. Zalmay Khalilzad, Strategic Appraisal 1996, Santa Monica, 
Rand,  p.  132.  See also F.  Stephen Larrabee, East  European Military Security after the Cold War, Santa 
Monica, Rand, 1993.
43 Mike Bowker, op. cit., p. 77.
44 Rossiyskie vesti, 29 October 1992, p. 1.
45 See Ye. Bazhanov, Top Priorities of Russia's Foreign Policy, in: New Times, October 1995, p. 32.
46 For details on Moscow's relations with Cuba, N. Korea, Vietnam see Latinskaya America, No. 10-11, 1992; 
Ye. Bazhanov and N. Bazhanova, Russia and Asia in 1992, in: Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1, January 
1993, pp. 91-109.
47 For more details see Ye. Bazhanov, Russian Policy Towards China, in: ed. Peter Shearman, Russian Foreign 
Policy..., op. cit., pp. 161-164.
The Kremlin's relations with ideological and geopolitical partners in the Third World that reach 
back to Soviet times also deteriorated. The Kremlin ceased to compete with the United States and 
it did not want to be manipulated by radical regimes which hoped to continue thriving on the 
contradictions  between  the  "two  super-powers".  Instead,  Moscow  proposed  to  develop  a 
partnership with the West which could serve as a bridge between the opposing sides in those 
regions (as, for example, in the Middle East). The former Soviet practices, when the USSR had 
relied on a handful of states in the Middle East and other parts of the world, were characterized 
by the new Russian  leaders as  "an extremely unfortunate  choice".48 Economic incentives to 
maintain cooperation with the traditional Soviet clients did not exist either. The entire Russian 
society demanded to stop helping any foreign countries and to concentrate instead on internal 
reforms. When elected President of the Russian Federation in 1991, Boris Yeltsin condemned the 
squandering of national resources,49 and in October 1991 he placed a ban on all foreign aid.50 
Attempts were made to turn cooperation with the Third World "friends" into mutually beneficial 
relations, but they did not yield immediate results.
Russia's  relations with  Syria,  Iraq  and  Libya  deteriorated.51 They also  declined with  India, 
Mongolia and a number of other states in South and East Asia.52 In Sub-Saharan Africa the same 
pattern developed. Even under Gorbachev the Soviet Union sharply reduced support for socialist-
oriented  states  while  calling  for  political  compromises to  end  regional  disputes.  This  fact 
prompted one Russian political  scientist to  talk  about  the "collapse" of the USSR's African 
policy.53 With Yeltsin in power Moscow reinforced its decision to get rid of "the ideological 
blinkers and the wasteful nature of the ties" with African countries.54 The resulting policy of the 
Kremlin was met with resentment in Black Africa, this applied especially to the Russian pressure 
to make them repay their debts.55
At the same time the new Russian government made considerable efforts to develop both political 
and economic relations with "stable, moderate and economically successful states" of the Third 
World.56 Many of them, as a matter of fact, were ignored by the Soviet Union, or they themselves 
ignored the communist giant. Russia made bold moves to promote its arms sales and other forms 
of trade and economic interaction with the Persian Gulf States. This line of activity started back 
in the spring of 1992 with Kozyrev's visit to that region.57 Considerable success was achieved in 
the field of promoting political understanding and economic cooperation with Iran and South 
Africa,58 South Korea, Taiwan, the ASEAN countries, Australia and New Zealand.59 Certain steps 
were taken to enforce ties with Latin American nations, though basically Russia kept a  low 
48 The Current Digest, Vol. XLIV, No. 18, 1992, pp. 15-16.
49 Moscow News, No. 9, 1991.
50 Izvestiya, 28 October 1991.
51 Amin Saikal,  Russian Policy Toward Central  Asia and the Middle East,  in:  ed. Peter Shearman, Russian 
Foreign Policy..., op. cit., pp. 267-282.
52 For details  see Ye. Bazhanov and N. Bazhanova, Russia and Asia in  1992,  op.  cit.,  pp.  98-99. Bhabani 
Sengupta, Former Friends: Time to Rebuild India-Russia Ties, in: Statesman Weekly (Calcutta), 29 February 
1992, p. 12.
53 A. Kiva, Afrika: i zdes zanovo?, in: Literaturnaya gazeta, 29 May 1991.
54 Izvestiya, December 6, 1992.
55 Charles Quist Adade, Russia to Swap Africa Debts for Food, in: New African, July 1992, pp. 32-33.
56 Reuters, 30 April 1992.
57 See Amin Saikal, op. cit., p. 272-274.
58 See Robert G. Patman, Russia's New Agenda in Sub-Saharan Africa, in: ed. Peter Shearman, Russian Foreign 
Policy..., op. cit., pp. 292-294.
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profile in that distant continent, not challenging the USA there anymore, but neither developing a 
pro-Western tinge in its policy.60
Such was the original thrust of the Russian foreign policy after the events of 1991. Partially it 
had been prepared by and based on Gorbachev's "new thinking". However, the new policy 
marked a great shift towards the West away from the traditional friends and concepts, as well as a 
denunciation of the past. Many facets of the original strategy of Russia's democrats still exist and 
can be witnessed in various moves and statements of Russia's leaders. Nevertheless, accelerating 
change in Moscow's foreign policy is also obvious. It is influenced by a number of internal and 
external factors.
Part II. Factors of Change
2.1 Internal situation
Internally, the failure of "shock therapy" has delivered a powerful blow to the camp of the radical 
reformers. They lost confidence, then unity as they split into warring factions. Quite a few simply 
left politics, others got engrossed in money making, corruption and the quest for privileges. Many 
democrats switched to the ranks of the opposition (former vice-president Alexander Rutskoi and 
Supreme Soviet  speaker  Ruslan  Khasbulatov,  to  name the  most  prominent  defectors).  The 
parliamentary elections of December 1993  made it  clear that,  above all,  democrats had lost 
support among wide circles of the Russian population.61
The parliamentary elections of 1995 gave even more clout to the opposition forces, especially the 
communists.62 They do not yet control the foreign policy, but their impact on the conduct of 
Russian diplomacy is increasingly felt. This pressure emanates from the conservative parliament, 
the "power" ministries (defense, interior etc.), military-industrial complex, significant segments of 
local elites and Russians living in the former republics of the Soviet Union. It is reinforced by 
various groups of democrats who are disappointed for various reasons with Yeltsin and his 
international  strategy.63 As a  result,  the influential  paper "Izvestiya" wrote in October 1995, 
"popularity of ardent pro-Western politicians among Russian voters suffered quite profoundly".64
Equally important is the fact that the government itself is different - radical democrats have been 
replaced by representatives of the old Soviet bureaucracy, most of whom agree with the public 
discontent over the foreign policy of 1991.65 The original democrats, still present in the ruling 
circles, are adjusting to the changing mood - some because of an instinct for self-preservation, 
others because they have come to realize that they had been naive in the past or that international 
60 Yuri Pavlov, Russian Policy Towards Latin America and Cuba, in:  ed. Peter Shearman, Russian Foreign 
Policy..., op. cit., p. 257.
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62 "Leftists" got control of 60% seats in the State Duma.
63 For details on the emergence of various and contradictory interests in the Russian society see Ot reformy k 
stabilizatsii, Moscow, MGIMO, 1995, pp. 123-131, 236-237, 241-248, 258, 262-263, 269-272, 275.
64 Izvestiya, 13 October 1995.
65 Among those "hardcore" democrats who left the government (voluntarily or otherwise) were Burbulis, Gaidar, 
Fedorov, Poltoranin, Starovoitova, Shakhrai, Shelov-Kovedyaev, Shokhin, Filatov. Influential posts dealing 
with  national  security  have  been  held  by  people,  who  oppose  anti-western,  pro-communist  and  anti-
democratic ideas in various degrees - Korshakov, Barsukov, Yegorov, Lobov, Soskovets etc.
realities  have  changed  since  1991.66 An  excellent  analysis  of  the  growing  impact  of  the 
conservatives on Yeltsin's foreign policy is  contained in  Neil  Malcolm's article  on Russian 
foreign policy decision-making.67
Another internal factor influencing the conduct of the Russian diplomacy is Russia's all embrac-
ing political,  economic and  social  crisis.  The  government is  so  preoccupied with  domestic 
problems that it simply does not have time to act adequately in the international arena. Due to 
internal predicaments, negotiations with foreign dignitaries are sometimes cancelled and state 
visits abroad are cut short. There is little opportunity to concentrate on the development of a 
coherent, well-thought-out strategy in world affairs. When Moscow does act, more often than not 
its behavior is dictated by events at home: either outside support is sought against domestic foes 
or  additional  financial  aid  is  requested to  avert  a  total  economic collapse.68 The  feeling of 
insecurity is further deepened by the collapse of Russia's defense industries. As experts claim, 
"the capability of the defense complex to satisfy the needs of the armed forces in armaments and 
military equipment is in danger".69
The absence of an effective mechanism for the implementation of the foreign policy makes things 
even worse. Back in the communist days that mechanism was simple and quite effective. One 
pyramid of authority existed with the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party at the top. The Politburo passed resolutions and all branches of the foreign policy apparatus 
knew exactly what they were supposed to do. Nowadays a  number of independent or semi-
independent "Politburos" function in Moscow, each competing with the others and attempting to 
pursue its own foreign policy. The result is chaos from which it is difficult to discern the essence 
of Russia's position on important international issues. It is a universally accepted fact that various 
government agencies pursue their own and contradictory national security policy.70 Numerous 
attempts by Yeltsin to put the foreign policy mechanism in order did not work.71 To a certain 
degree  difficulties  in  the  field  of  foreign policy  were  enhanced  by  the  weaknesses of  the 
diplomatic personnel. A typical argument is that unexperienced, young officials "did not initially 
understand the tough world of 'Realpolitik', only too late did they realize that Russia had its own 
national-state  interests,  not  necessarily identical  with  interests of America  and the  states of 
Western Europe which were anxious to fill the geopolitical vacuum in Eastern Europe and not 
only there".72
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2.2 Behavior of the West
Among those external factors which have produced changes in Russian foreign policy, the be-
havior of the West should be singled out. I think it is indisputable that the West has not delivered 
what it has promised Russia. In any case, this is a common belief among Russians, including 
many democrats.73 The West, the argument goes, has failed to become a reliable ideological and 
political  ally.  Quite  a  few politicians in  the West prefer Russia  to  remain weak  and poor, 
regarding it as a potential foe.74 The NATO eastward expansion is treated in Moscow as a be-
trayal,75 expression of distrust and even hostile attitude towards Russia,76 an attempt to isolate it 
by a new "Iron Curtain" and finally as a security challenge.77 In the fall of 1995 Yeltsin himself 
went as  far  as  warning that  the NATO  enlargement could "light  the  fires of war  all  over 
Europe".78
In Russian political circles including the government, the unilateral NATO actions in Bosnia,79 
the refusal to support Russia's complaints about mistreatment of the Russian speaking population 
in the Baltic republics,80 the attempts to influence Russia's relations with Arab countries (such as 
Iraq or Libya)81 and the pro-Japanese stand on the Kuril islands dispute between Moscow and 
Tokyo have been regarded as unfriendly moves. Russia has been upset about the unwillingness of 
the West to endorse the reintegration of the former Soviet republics and especially the leading 
role of Moscow in that area.82 For the Kremlin this is another proof that the West does not treat 
Russia  in a  friendly manner and does not respect Moscow's vital  interests. Kozyrev angrily 
rejected the Western attitude saying that Moscow would not listen to "lessons and lectures" on the 
Russian  behavior  in  the  former  USSR.83 The  Minister  repeatedly  called  upon  the  West  to 
recognize "Russia's special role and responsibility in the former Soviet Union".84
Russians are unhappy with the results of the economic cooperation with the West. The West is 
criticized for not substantially extending their aid to crisis-stricken Russia. Loans and credits are 
small and highly conditional.85 Investments are negligible.86 Many Western businesspeople "rob" 
Russia, buying up its natural resources for pennies. The West, Russians complain, is trying to 
73 It is equally true that Russia and the Russians gave the West plenty of reasons to behave exactly the way it has 
been behaving.
74 See Ya. Plyas, op. cit., pp. 14-15.
75 New Times, No. 6, 1994. The magazine, quoting top Russian officials and scholars, stressed that it was not 
fear of the direct military threat so much as the psychological consequences that would result. It was said that 
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84 Andrei Kozyrev, The Lagging Partnership..., op. cit., p. 69.
85 A statement by Viktor Gerashchenko, the head of Russia's State Bank, Segodnya, 22 April 1994.
86 Ot reformy k stabilizatsii..., op. cit., pp. 66-70.
turn the former super-power into an "economic colony" of the developed world.87 In exchange for 
valuable resources, the West ships "out-dated and dangerous items" (like cigarettes or phony 
medicine) to Russia.88 Technology transfer is still impeded by legislative restrictions.89 And when 
Russia tries to earn money by exporting its own technology, its moves are blocked.90 Among 
publicized cases are Russo-American tensions over sales of cryogenic engines to India, military 
aircraft to Malaysia, nuclear equipment to Iran etc.91
There is also disappointment with the West as a model for Russia's development. An increasing 
number of even reform-minded people believes that Western recipes cannot be copied, Russia is 
too different, too unique to follow Western methods.92 Western advisers to the Russian gov-
ernment have become the target of vicious attacks. Their Russian admirers (among them former 
Prime Minister Gaidar) are equally denounced.93 Complaints are heard that the West, especially 
Washington,  currently  looks  down on Russia  and  the  Russians,  treats  them as  second-rate 
citizens, openly shows disrespect for Moscow and insults Russia.
In fact, unequal relations do exist between the West and Russia, which are inevitable:94 Moscow 
depends on the West not only economically, but politically as well. This dependence was still 
evident  on  the  eve  of  the  1996  presidential  elections  in  Russia.  Washington  used  every 
opportunity to support Yeltsin, be it with the IMF loans, restrained treatment of Russia's behavior 
in the world arena, silence regarding Moscow's military operations in Chechnya, etc.95 Yeltsin 
again solicited the help of President Bill Clinton stressing that the US President "must support 
Russia which means supporting B. Yeltsin".96
2.3 Other problems
The relations with the former republics of the USSR are another important external factor in-
fluencing Russian foreign policy. Democrats in Moscow have shed their initial  illusions that 
relations among former parts of the USSR will develop in a friendly and smooth manner. Right 
from the start, most of Russia's new neighbors displayed open disgust for Russia and the Rus-
sians. Monuments to Russian poets were demolished and ethnic Russians were denied basic 
rights. Russians in the "near abroad" have become a serious headache for all those involved. The 
problems concern the right of Russians and Russian speaking people to remain unmolested on the 
territory of the former Soviet Union, their right to become citizens of the newly independent 
states,  their  autonomy, the absorption of a  huge flow of refugees, etc.  These problems are 
exacerbated by the economic and social crisis, rising nationalism, demographic fears of small 
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nations, like Latvia or Estonia etc.97 There are also controversies over the division of property, 
arbitrary borders, economic equality, political, ideological, historical issues etc.98
While there is a certain desire of the new governments to cooperate more intensively with the 
Kremlin, the prevailing mood is nevertheless to safeguard the newly won independence. There 
are suspicions that Russia may try to challenge them. Also, the leaders of the newly independent 
states have a tendency to see a Russian hand behind their difficulties, and to look for protection 
against Russia's alleged encroachments elsewhere - in  the West,  in  the South, in  the East.99 
Reciprocal moves by the "would-be-protectors" of the newly independent states make Moscow 
even more nervous. Such moves feed fears that Russia will be pushed out of its traditional sphere 
of influence, isolated and will suffer economically, politically and strategically.100 An expressed 
desire of almost  every East  European state  to  join  NATO  has  greatly increased Moscow's 
attention to its former partners in the Warsaw Pact. It has revealed that the East European nations 
do not look at the new Russia as an ideological and political friend, but rather consider Moscow 
to be a threat to their security and sovereignty.101 Difficult issues have arisen before the Kremlin: 
The questions are how to keep the East Europeans out of NATO and how to attract them closer 
to Russia?102
The retreats from the remaining communist countries have created additional difficulties for the 
Russian diplomacy. Consequently, Russia not only lost certain economic opportunities in North 
Korea, but it also lost its influence on the regime and thus on the promotion of stability and peace 
in the vicinity of its own borders.103 China's aloofness was even more damaging to Russia's 
interests, especially in the light of the fact that the West did not meet Moscow's expectations. 
China increasingly seemed to become a useful strategic partner, a valuable customer, interested 
in Russia's industrial equipment and armaments and a vehicle for Moscow's expansion into Asia 
and the Pacific etc.104
Due to its disappointment regarding the amount of support from the USA and Western Europe 
Moscow realized it would be easier to top up its financial resources and technology with the help 
of the fast developing economies of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and the ASEAN states.105 
There  were  geo-strategic  as  well  as  economic  reasons  for  going  back  to  Mongolia  and 
Indochina.106 The slackening cooperation with India equally seemed to be a mistake. In 1993 
Yeltsin himself acknowledged this fact saying that the people and politicians of India and Russia 
"have a great accumulated wealth of political goodwill and diplomatic traditions".107 As Moscow 
was gradually realizing, no strong foreign policy was possible "without India or without taking 
into consideration India's interests, its global weight and its authority".108
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The Middle East restored its importance in the eyes of the Kremlin leaders as well. Iran was 
recognized as a lucrative arms customer and an important fulcrum of Moscow's interests in the 
region. Teheran could be useful in restraining Islamic radicalism in Central Asia and Transcau-
casia. Russo-Iranian friendship could encourage the Arab states (especially the Gulf's oil-rich 
ones) and Turkey to defer to Russia as the only power with the leverage to stop Iran from 
destabilizing the region further.109 The deterioration of relations with the Soviet allies in the 
Middle East - Iraq, Syria, Libya - prevented Moscow from recovering debts amounting to over 
10 billion US-Dollars.110 Russia's support of the sanctions against Iraq and Libya has also become 
an economic disaster for Moscow: its total loss has been around 16 billion US-Dollars.111 Having 
lost the connections with the old friends of the USSR Russia was not able to play a significant 
role as a broker in the peace process in the Middle East.112 Moscow's policy regarding the conflict 
between Arabs and Israelis was progressively subordinated to the American activities. On the 
whole, Russia  was loosing ground in a  strategically important,  unstable region close to the 
Russian  borders  and  influencing  Russian  security.113 There  were  clear  losses  -  economic, 
geopolitical, cultural and in prestige - in Black Africa and Latin America due to the pro-Western 
"tilt" in Moscow's foreign policy and its low-profile in other regions of the world.114
Moscow's foreign policy also evolved in reaction to changes in the world at large. Just a few 
years ago, both Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's supporters talked quite seriously about creating one 
close-knit family of nations, encompassing all of mankind. One of Gorbachev's assistants, Georgi 
Shakhnazarov, went so far as to propose the establishment of a world government on the basis of 
UN structures.115 It seemed to Russian (Soviet) democrats that with the end of the Cold War 
between the two ideological camps and the two super-powers nothing could cloud harmony and 
brotherhood on the planet. Now, of course, that dream is over. Even high-school students realize 
that the world of today is instable, fraught with national, religious, territorial, racial and other 
conflicts.
Part III. Debates
3.1 Westernizers
Due to the internal and external factors, discussed in Part II, Yeltsin's and Kozyrev's foreign 
policy became the target of criticism. It  was getting ever stronger and grew into a full-scale 
national debate. The debate has been closely connected with the question of the overall devel-
opment strategy for the country: What should Russia's priorities be? What measures should be 
taken by the Russian people? The diversified views reflect the emergence of a pluralistic society 
in its transitional stage in Russia. Newly formed economic and social groups compete for influ-
ence, power, profit and intensely search for the appropriate ideological and political expression of 
their interests. The picture is further complicated by large numbers of young intellectuals, who 
strive for recognition and exploit difficulties of the country for self-promotion. The old ruling 
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class, which is split into various factions, makes its own contributions to the debate aiming at 
revenge and revanche.116 Right from the start the main thrust of the criticism was directed against 
the pro-Western "tilt" in Yeltsin's and Kozyrev's policy. Even according to mild critics this "tilt" 
turned  Russia  into  a  "junior  partner"  of  the  West,  stripped  it  of  its  super-power  status, 
undermined  Russian  security  and  damaged  Moscow's  economic,  political  and  ideological 
interests throughout the world. Russia's stand on the former Soviet republics became the second 
major area of criticism. The government has been blamed for the destruction of a great state, 
creation of immense problems for its population, neglect of relations with the new neighbors etc.
Which alternatives have been proposed for the original policies? Though it is not easy to classify 
different views and positions, I would nevertheless venture to divide the debaters into four major 
camps (or schools of thought). The first may be called Westernizers. They clearly dominated 
Soviet and then Russian political life in 1990-1992.117 The positions of the Westernizers have 
already been discussed in Part I. Here I shall just recapitulate some of their main arguments. 
According to the Westernizers, the confrontation between the West and the USSR which had 
been going on for decades was the product of the Bolsheviks' ideology and policy. This line had 
had disastrous consequences for the country and it had to be altered. Russia's vital interest should 
be to overcome the deep rift between itself and the West, created by the Bolsheviks' rule and to 
rejoin "the family of civilized nations." To achieve this purpose Russia would have to stop the 
super-power competition with the USA for the world hegemony, as such a policy would lead to a 
dead-end. It would trigger the expansion of NATO to the East, slow down integration into the 
framework  of  the  CIS,  block  Russia  from the main  sources of technological  and  financial 
resources, revive the military confrontation in which Russia would not even have allies. Maybe 
only Iran or North Korea would join Russia in this struggle. But what would be the contribution 
of such allies towards the fulfillment of the aspirations of the Russian people?
These aspirations are very simple and clear: to finally create a  normal life for themselves - 
prosperous, free and stable. Therefore it  is not reasonable to once again invent "the unique 
Russian way", pushing the nation into the wild feudalism or bloody communism and making 
anti-Western propaganda. In order to prevent the Russian "brain drain" to the West and to raise 
the standard of living within the country it is necessary to promote an open market economy and 
develop a full-fledged democratic society in Russia. This can and should be done in cooperation 
and with the help of the West. There is simply no other way. All nations, without exception, 
which have lately achieved economic and social progress have acted exactly in this way - Japan, 
South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Chile, Turkey etc. Accordingly, Russian foreign policy should 
be subordinated to the paramount national task - to the construction of a normal human society in 
Russia.
The Westernizers have their own explanation for the recent unfavorable changes in the behavior 
of America and its allies towards Russia. The main underlying reason for those changes is the 
fact that the West (and Eastern Europe as well) is loosing hope in the "glorious democratic 
future" of Russia, due to the victories of the communists and Zhirinovsky in the parliamentary 
elections. Further reasons are the continuous economic and social crisis in Russia, the fact that 
foreign aid is being stolen by bureaucrats and the Mafia, that laws are not applied and that for-
eign investors are confronted with an almost hostile attitude. The following conclusions are 
drawn in the West: a) a crisis-stricken country does not have good chances of becoming a stable 
116 For a detailed analysis of the participants of the debate see: Ot reformy k..., op. cit., pp. 241-250, 254-259, 
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democracy;  b)  extending assistance to  Russia  means throwing away  money;  c)  developing 
business ties with it is risky; d) the rise of anti-Western extremists to power in the Kremlin is 
getting more and more likely.
As a consequence, the desire to expand NATO grows, the readiness to accommodate Moscow's 
requests and wishes is reduced and distrust regarding any actions of the Kremlin - in Chechnya, 
Iran or in the Far East - is increasing. Due to the changing political atmosphere the West sees the 
ambitions of Russia to play the role of a super-power in a different light. On one hand, Russia 
needs the West and depends on it. On the other hand, it challenges the West and attempts to 
compete with it  for supremacy. In spite of the fact that there are differences in the national 
interests between Russia and the USA, and other Western states, the Westernizers argue that 
Moscow should nevertheless cope with those differences in the framework of the overall strategy 
of cooperation with the West.118
3.2 Anti-Western camp
The second camp is of the directly opposite opinion as the first one. It is clearly anti-Western. 
These people reject the notion that the West and Russia can be friends. Their belief is completely 
different. The thesis is advanced that for centuries the West has tried to undermine Russia's 
strength and influence. Back  in the 13th  century the Pope sent crusaders to politically and 
spiritually subjugate the Baltic region and then Russia. If the Russians had not fought off the 
invaders, it would never have become a super-power with a unique civilization. It might at best 
have repeated the destiny of Ukraine and Belorussia, which were conquered by Lithuanians and 
Poles and never came into prominence regarding international relations, economic development, 
or culture. In the following sevenhundred years, again and again the West attempted to achieve 
the ultimate goal of destroying Russia - the best known examples of such attempts were the 
invasions of Napoleon and Hitler. It is only by rebuffing these encroachments that Russia has 
managed to survive.119 Finally, in the last decade of the 20th century the West, it is maintained, 
almost  succeeded in  eliminating  Russia  as  a  super-power,  with  the  help  of  "traitors"  like 
Gorbachev, Yeltsin and others. Leaders of the nationalist and communist opposition go so far as 
to claim that all the misfortunes experienced by the USSR and Russia in the last ten years have 
been planned in Washington and then executed according to this plan.120 Variations of these views 
can  be  found  in  numerous  written  and  oral  statements  of  the  communist  leader  Gennadi 
Zyuganov. According to Zyuganov, the West and its "lackeys" in Russia "rob our nation" and 
"insult the nation on purpose". They also state that "attempts are being made to tailor Russia 
118 The author of this  study examined views of the Westernizers in,  for instance,  the following articles:  Ye. 
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according to overseas samples". Zyuganov stresses that "kneeling down you won't buy peace", 
that the Communist Party will not hesitate to terminate the unfair international treaties".121
In  his book "Za gorizontom" Zyuganov argues that  the Western civilization is increasingly 
controlled economically, culturally and ideologically by the Jewish Diaspora and "under these 
conditions a special significance is being acquired by the Slavic civilization embodied in the 
Russian Empire, which has become the last bastion against Western hegemonism".122 Zyuganov's 
views on Jews are echoed by nationalistic parties. Jews are being blamed by them for introducing 
democracy to Russia "in order to destroy the unique Russian civilization". They are called the 
convinced enemies of the Russian people.123 Among military officers and experts it has become a 
routine to call the USA and other NATO countries at least "opponents" and "occasional potential 
adversaries". Russia's capabilities are invariably compared to those of the West with the purpose 
of determining whether Russia can sustain a large war or several smaller ones against the West.124 
The USA is denounced for attempts to undermine the Russian military, economic and financial 
potential through the implementation of strategic armaments treaties. Nationalist authors accuse 
the West of trying "to lure Russia into a long and exhausting conflict against the Islamic world in 
order to conquer both camps and grab their resources."125
Those who share fears about the Western threat suggest various ways on how to counter the 
West. Most feel that Russia should seek alliances with the former Soviet republics. Statements to 
this effect have even been made by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and other members of the 
cabinet.126 Yeltsin himself and the new Foreign Minister Primakov alluded to such possibilities. 
The communists go further than the Kremlin. An example is the fact that the communists brought 
about the decision of the Russian State Duma to terminate the 1991 treaty on the dissolution of 
the USSR. Nationalists not  only support  communists in  this endeavor, but  have even more 
grandiose goals. Vladimir Zhirinovsky would like to return to the borders of 1900, when, among 
other countries, Poland, Finland and Manchuria were under the Tzar's control.127 Russia's final 
push, according to Zhirinovsky, must be made towards the South. Conquering along the way 
Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Russian soldiers will reach the Indian Ocean and wash their 
boots in its warm waters.128 Another prominent chauvinist-imperialist, the editor of the newspaper 
"Zavtra", Alexander Prokhanov, dreams of the Russian empire stretching from Japan to Portugal. 
The main obstacle to these ambitious plans is  "the modern Carthage", the United States of 
America. Consequently, the USA "must be destroyed". Prokhanov realizes the difficulty of this 
task, but he is ready to fight for it, since he "loves the Russian Empire, as other people love 
horses, flowers or birds".129
Among those who harbor doubts or fears concerning the intentions of the West there are people 
who suggest other allies for Russia: some single out Iran, many prefer China.130 Former Defense 
Minister Pavel Grachev has also hinted at the possibility of Moscow's alliance with "influential 
countries in the East and the South" as a response to the NATO enlargement.131
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3.3 Enemies are everywhere
The third school of thought in the national foreign policy debate unites those who spot enemies 
everywhere. They call upon compatriots to close the country to the outside and maintain a tight 
defense system.132 A typical example of such logic is a study on the armed forces reforms by a 
conservative think-tank, the Defense Research Institute (DRI). The study claims that Russia has 
numerous enemies, "who are acting more and more openly and arrogantly in the light of the 
weakness of the Russian state, progressing degradation of its military and economic potential".133 
The report specifies that" the most probable adversaries of Russia remain the United States and 
the NATO countries".134 Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Japan are also considered among 
the direct threats to the Russian security, while China and Iran are excluded from the list but only 
for the time being. Later, the DRI believes, nuclear deterrence might also be necessary in the case 
of China.135 According to the DRI there are also enemies of Moscow on the territory of the former 
Soviet Union - they are "forces of aggressive nationalism, which act  with the support from 
outside and possess own military formations" (like the Baltic states, the Tajik opposition etc.).136
Some politicians and scholars,  who are  anti-Western, concentrate especially on the Chinese 
threat. A prominent Russian historian Professor V. Myasnikov argues: "The history of Russia's 
relations with China span over 400 years. But never during this whole period has China devel-
oped as fast as now. It is precisely from the Russian perspective that one can see in the clearest 
way the achievements of "the great dragon" and prospects of its further growth. It is not realistic 
to expect that China will miss its chance to derive profits from this situation".137 Myasnikov goes 
on to say that China's "people's diplomacy" is turning into "an illegal ethnic expansion" and that 
Chinese businessmen "just like a giant pump suck up Russian resources and hard currency with 
the psychology of a rich neighbor, who intends to rob the home of an unfortunate co-peasant".138 
The historian claims that Chinese authorities advertise Russia as "a great Northern virgin land" 
where Chinese citizens can easily cheat and enrich themselves.139 The Chinese presumably "look 
down upon the Russians and feel sure that they only temporarily have to tolerate the historical 
injustice of the Maritime provinces and the Amur basin areas belonging to Russia."140 Myasnikov 
believes that the PRC authorities use the educational system, mass media, movie industry and 
other methods to promote the thesis that China has "lost" 1,5 million square km of its territory to 
Russia on the basis of "unequal treaties". Such an attitude was supported by Deng Xiaoping 
himself, and, as a result, the Chinese businessmen "sometimes threaten to throw their Russian 
customers out of the Far East."141
As for Zhirinovsky, his party's official platform as well as personal written and oral statements 
name China, Turkey, the Jews and the West as Russia's adversaries. China is suspected to be 
encroaching on Russia's Far East. Turkey is blamed for attempts to revive "the great Turkish 
empire". The West is denounced for its plan to turn Russia into an economic colony. And finally, 
the Jews are  condemned for their  mafia-type control  of the whole world and their  plan  to 
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subjugate Russia as well.142 Similar views are exposed by above-mentioned newspaper "Zavtra". 
It writes: "Russia, deprived of everything, lacking defense, with its scattered people, encircled by 
enemies, flooded with traitors and scoundrels, is slowly starting to utter its secret thoughts".143 
Considering the depth of Russia's internal crisis which is contrasted by the widening gap between 
Russia and the West in terms of economic development and the steady and fast progress of China, 
such paranoid feelings may grow even stronger.144
3.4 Balanced foreign policy
The fourth opinion, voiced in the national debates in Russia, calls for a balanced strategy re-
garding foreign politics. Its essence is: Russia does not have enemies. It can and should cooperate 
with most countries of the world, especially the neighboring ones. Moscow should not "tilt" to 
any side. Because of its geographical position, size, power and history it must maintain balanced 
relations with the West, the East and the South without trying to ally with one or the other 
(possible exceptions are the CIS members).
This philosophy can be found in the platforms of the government's political union "Our Home 
Russia"  (OHR)  and "Yabloko",  a  democratic  party of the  opposition. The  OHR  insists on 
"partnership, not confrontation with other states, with both the East and the West" and "active 
participation in the creation of such a world order, that is based on the principles of overall 
security,  respect for  sovereignty,  independence and  territorial  integrity of states,  democratic 
elections, protection of human rights and mutually advantageous economic cooperation."145 The 
program of the OHR is aimed at  creating a  favorable international environment for internal 
reforms.146 Again and again it stresses that Russia will pursue the development of partnerships 
with all countries, including China.147
"Yabloko" also rejects any imperial Russian ambitions. It supports "a widely comprehensive and 
serious dialogue as well as good relations with the USA, Japan and China". However, it does not 
feel that Russia should seek alliances. Instead, Russia should simply cooperate with all of these 
countries on equal terms.148 As for the threats to Russia's security, "Yabloko" sees them only 
emanating  from  the  southern  neighbors,  such  as  Turkey,  Pakistan  and  Afghanistan  and 
aggressive Islamic fundamentalism.149 According to "Yabloko", in this respect Russia and the 
West have common interests (as well as in such fields as the struggle against terrorism, the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons etc.).150
Since 1993  Foreign Minister Kozyrev increasingly advanced the same views. They are also 
found in the statements of his heir Yevgeni Primakov, who, for instance, says: "Russia must con-
duct a diversified, active policy in all the directions, that concern Russian interests [...]; this is a 
vital necessity in order to create optimal conditions for the internal development, a more dynamic 
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and more effective one, in our changing world".151 There are quite a few other politicians - starting 
with  the  former  State  Duma  Speaker  Ivan  Rybkin  and  including participants  of  the  1996 
presidential race, Svyatoslav Fedorov and Mikhail Gorbachev, who subscribe to the above-dis-
cussed foreign policy philosophy.152 Even Zyuganov, in an obvious contradiction to his other 
statements, has to talk in a similar fashion when addressing a Western audience. Thus, writing 
for the "New York Times" in 1996, the communist leader said: "Our state's unique role is to be 
the pivot  and fulcrum of a  Eurasian  continental  bloc - and consequently it  has to find the 
necessary balance between East and West".153
3.5 Public opinion
The most intriguing question is: which of the four opinions appeals most to the general Russian 
public? It is also the most difficult question. Judging on the basis of the results of the parlia-
mentary elections in 1993 and 1995, it is certainly the xenophobic view that seems to prevail. 
Both parties which won the elections, the Communist Party and Zhirinovsky's Party, basically 
expound an  anti-Western,  anti-Jewish and to  a  certain  degree anti-Islamic and  anti-oriental 
philosophy. However, if we examine the rich data of numerous public opinion polls on foreign 
policy issues the picture is not so clear.
The results of the polls vary greatly due to the fact that the polls are not organized professionally, 
that they are often biased and that the public opinion itself is very much in flux and unstable. As 
some pollsters insist, no less than 70% of the Russians regret the collapse of the USSR, over 80% 
would welcome a revival of Russia's super-power status,154 and about 50% consider Ukraine "a 
transitional entity" and "a Russian sphere of influence".155 Certain Russian analysts believe that 
Zhirinovsky and other nationalists "skillfully play with some compatriots, hurt  patriotic and 
remaining imperial feelings."156 It is said that nowadays the Russians suffer from a very strong 
feeling of national humiliation because of the loss of their super-power status and from bitterness 
regarding the USA which continues to play the role of a  super-power.157 The following data 
reflects  the  prevailing  anti-Western  feelings:  by  1995  72%  of  the  Russians  came  to  the 
conclusion that their country could not copy the Western model for development, 75% felt that 
Russia could survive without Western aid and 52% criticized the negative influence the Western 
mass culture has on the Russian society.158
However, other polls reveal quite different tendencies in the Russian society. These polls show 
that security concerns and xenophobia have not really spread throughout the Russian society. 
Thus,  according to the national poll conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences (RAS) in the summer 1993, only 5% of the respondents identified defense 
as the top priority, whereas 33% approved of a cooperation with other countries even if it could 
limit Russia's independence. The majority of the remaining 62% favored cooperation on equal 
terms. Half of the participants in the poll were in favor of allowing foreigners to privately own 
Russian enterprises.159 In January 1995 a poll conducted by the Institute of Socio-Political Studies 
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of the RAS revealed that only 10% of the respondents cared about Russia's super-power status, 
and only 5,4% blamed their difficulties on the West, 6,1% wanted the resurrection of the USSR, 
but only on the principles of equality.160 In another poll (in December 1995)  the respondents 
could not care less about the NATO expansion (0,7% cared), economic pressure of the West (5% 
cared) or dominance of imported goods on the Russian market (7% cared). They demonstrated 
slightly stronger feelings about the flight of resources from Russia (14%) and the fate of the 
Russian diaspora (10%). Yet the same people felt that Russia's second priority was to regain the 
status of a strong power, the third was to overcome national humiliation. 61% of the respondents 
regarded the reestablishment of Russia as a super-power to be a top priority, 77% actively cared 
about restoring the national dignity.161 Having analyzed the very contradictory data provided by 
the various polls we arrived at the conclusion that what really counts now in Russia (as far as 
foreign policy priorities are concerned) are the prevailing moods in the politically active circles. 
After all, ordinary Russians have a tradition that reaches back for centuries to stay away from 
state issues, especially those connected with security and foreign policy matters. The public has 
been used to following the leaders' views on these topics (actually, this also seems to be true in 
the West).
Part IV. Motives
Due to the impact of internal and external factors and specifically the national debates, described 
in Part III, the initial foreign policy motives of the new Russia are being gradually modified. The 
Kremlin has taken the strong domestic criticism into account. It has realized that democratic 
values and economic reforms no longer trigger  enthusiastic  responses on the part  of many 
politically active Russians, that the West is not adored, that the bitterness over the break-up of the 
USSR has been growing, that former friends of the USSR (communist and developing countries) 
are no longer abhorred by most Russian political elites and that those elites are tired of making 
concessions and asking forgiveness in the international arena.
4.1 National security
Security concerns are starting to move back to the forefront. Despite pressure from the ranks of 
the conservatives, the Kremlin does not perceive the West as a  direct threat.162 However, the 
feeling persists that if Russia falls too much behind the leading powers in the military realm, it 
could become subject to manipulation and intimidation. There is a growing apprehension that the 
West, if it is not controlled, may come to dominate Russia economically, may exclude it from 
Europe,  deny it  access to  Eastern  Europe and  former  parts  of  the  USSR and  that  a  new 
"encirclement of the Motherland" may start forming. Such worries, greatly enhanced by the plans 
for the expansion of NATO, are no longer limited to the extremist camp and are spreading 
through the entire establishment of the Russian Federation.163 In the eyes of the Russians the 
expansion of NATO  to  Eastern Europe will  in  the long run lead to a  new division of the 
continent, dangerous to the peace and to the development in Russia. It is also a common belief in 
Moscow these days that while Russia step by step tries to get closer to the former union republics, 
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the West encourages them to strengthen their independence and look for partners outside the 
perimeter of the defunct Soviet Union.164 As Russian officials complain, the United States and its 
allies attempt to attract the newly independent states with the help of "small and insignificant 
favors". However, the Western powers "do not really do anything" to help these crisis-stricken 
states. That burden still rests on the shoulders of Russia.165
"The aim of the West", a leading Russian politician declared at a high level meeting, "is to cut 
Russia off from the CIS countries, to restrict its field of activity and to make it passive and weak 
in the international arena."166 It is regularly suggested in the Russian press (both by officials and 
journalists) that the CIA assists in the creation and development of the secret services of the 
Baltic republics and Georgia, and that Americans use Russia's new neighbors to steal Moscow's 
secrets and undermine its strength.167
Security concerns associated with Russia's immediate neighbors are even more obvious.168 The 
situation in Tajikistan and on its borders to Afghanistan is perceived as a direct threat to Russia's 
vital interests.169 Just a couple of years ago, Yeltsin and his associates used to denounce the Soviet 
involvement in Afghanistan. Now, Yeltsin declares the borders of Tajikistan to Afghanistan to be 
Russian and, responding to the appeals of the Tajik authorities, keeps reinforcing Russian troops 
in the area. There they clash with the same mujahidin, who were the adversaries of the Soviet 
troops in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Yeltsin justifies his actions on the basis of anxiety concerning 
Muslim extremist groups. If successful, these groups would threaten the well-being and lives of 
ethnic Russians in Tajikistan as well as the economic and geo-strategic interests of Russia. The 
other republics of Central Asia would follow suit and a  hostile wave would hit the Russian 
Federation.
The Caucasus region is another security concern. It is fraught with conflict - Armenia and Az-
erbaijan fighting over Nagorny Karabakh and the ethnic Georgian minorities, the Abkhazians 
and South Ossetians, fighting one another. The high mountains in that area are inhabited by 
Russia's own ethnic minorities, some of whom (especially Chechens) cause Moscow tremendous 
problems. The region appears even more ominous because of attempts of Turkey and a number 
of Arab states to interfere in these conflicts on the side of the Muslim participants (Azeris and 
various mountain tribes).170 The Baltic states ignite the Kremlin's security concerns with their 
mistreatment of local Russians, the denunciation of the Soviet Union's activities during World 
War II as well as their (Latvian, Estonian) territorial demands with regard to Russia. It is feared 
that Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians might be the first to "start rebuilding the iron curtain" at 
the Western borders of Russia171 and that Moscow could be denied access to the Baltic sea and its 
warm-water ports. Kaliningrad, the only remaining Russian foothold in the area, is separated 
164 Lately complaints are heard that Washington is "trying hard to drive a wedge between Kiev and Moscow" in 
order  to  use  Ukraine  as  "the  main guarantee  against  the  return  of  a  unified  state  to  the  world  arena", 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 23 March 1996, p. 3.
165 Ed. Ye. Bazhanov, Rossiya i SShA..., op. cit., p. 97.
166 Segodnya, 10 February 1996.
167 Ibid.
168 The Russian military doctrine stresses the necessity to create a new security belt along the borders of the 
former Soviet Union, to safeguard the country against various conflicts and the attempts of hostile forces to 
fill the political and military vacuum (See: Krasnaya zvezda, 19 November 1993). The government feels that 
"Russia should bear the main burden of peace-keeping efforts on the territory of the CIS" and that the stability 
in this region is "directly linked to the security of our state". (Ed. A. Shutov, Problemy SNG..., op. cit., p. 12).
169 Eugene Bazhanov and Natasha Bazhanova, Russia and Asia in 1993..., op. cit., p. 88.
170 Ed. A. Shutov, Problemy SNG..., op. cit., pp. 22-32.
171 Rossiya i Baltika, Moscow, IAMP, 1996 (in print), pp. 18, 33, 40.
from the rest of the country by Lithuania. Germans, who used to own Kaliningrad (then called 
Koenigsberg), might one day seek its recovery with Lithuanian collaboration.172
The dispute with Ukraine over the ownership of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, its base in Sevas-
topol, and the whole Crimean peninsula, as well as tensions involving Russians in Moldova, add 
to the security concerns shaping the Russian foreign policy.173 There are also fears of a  less 
immediate nature - the ever-tense situation in Korea, the drama of the former Yugoslavia, the 
Middle Eastern cauldron and the Japanese claim on the South Kuril islands.174
As a result of all these incidents, trends and events, security measures are being increased by the 
Russian authorities. The armed forces, which were downgraded in the recent past, have moved 
back into the centre of attention. The grandeur of the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the 
victory over fascism in May 1995 even surpassed that of the celebrations in the Brezhnev era 
(which was famous for celebrating that day with tremendous pomp). The victors were given new 
locations for celebration purposes in the most prestigious part of Moscow. A new monument to 
the war hero Marshal Zhukov was erected. The government is also emphasising the development 
of modern weaponry and the necessity of effective, strong armed forces to maintain a balance 
with the world's major military powers.175 No one talks about the total elimination of nuclear 
weapons anymore (as Gorbachev had done). They are in fact recognized as the most reliable 
guarantee for Russian security.176 The "perestroika" slogan of opening the borders and destroying 
barriers among peoples has been replaced with the thesis of reinforcing border troops and making 
the  Russian  territory  (and  that  of  the  other  CIS  members)  impenetrable  for  violators  and 
enemies.177 The military activities of former adversaries and all Russia's neighbors are watched 
attentively. A general from the Defense ministry asked recently: "Why do the Japanese retain 
more troops on Hokkaido than we have on the Kuril islands? Isn't it possible, that they have some 
kind of plan to take the Kurils by force?"178
Foreign intelligence, which was castigated back in 1992  as  "the subversive arm" of Soviet 
communism, has regained its respect in the eyes of both, society and the government. The arrest 
of Mr. Ames, a Russian agent within the CIA, was interpreted in Moscow as a serious blow to 
national  security.179 It  has also become fashionable for retired (and even active) intelligence 
officers to recount their noble actions for the good of the Motherland on Russian TV.
Security motives move Moscow in the direction of creating a collective security system with 
other CIS states.180 There is a growing urge on the part of the Kremlin to restore the cooperation 
with the Soviet friends in the Third  World. This is  based, among other things, on security 
reasons.  Political  leaders have come to  realize that  balancing the  Western connection with 
partnerships in the East and the South (i.e. China, India, ASEAN, the Arab countries etc.) the 
Kremlin will be able to act more confidently in the international arena. Russia will be better 
172 Ibid., p. 26.
173 V. Portnikov, Debyut integratora, in: Itogi, 12 February 1996, p. 30.
174 The military and most notably former Defense Minister Pavel Grachev clearly repudiated Yeltsin's promises to 
withdraw troops from the Kurils as "a blow to Russia's national security" (see Reuters Textline, 6 April 1992).
175 Yu. Fedorov, Voennaya doktrina Rossii, in: Ot reformy k..., op. cit., pp. 103-119.
176 The Chief of the Russian General Staff Mikhail Kolesnikov characterizes the nuclear force as "the guarantor 
of  the  national  security  of  the  Russian  state,  its  pride  and  the  foundation  of  its  might" (Yu.  Fedorov, 
Voennaya doktrina..., op. cit., pp. 103-119).
177 See, for example, Krasnaya zvezda, 10 September 1995.
178 Proceedings of a seminar on Security in the Far East, 5 March 1996, Moscow, IAMP (unpublished).
179 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 2 April 1994.
180 B. Gromov, O nekotorykh..., op. cit., p. 11.
prepared for any sudden changes in world politics and economics.181 It is also argued that co-
operative relations with Iran and extremist Arab regimes will help to deter their interference 
(ideological, religious and military) in Russia's ethnic affairs. Vietnam is important as a naval 
base for the Russian fleet in the Pacific, Mongolia as a buffer against possible future encroach-
ments by an increasingly powerful China. Rapprochement with North Korea will make it pos-
sible to restrain that dangerous regime etc.
4.2 Nationalism and super-power ambitions
Nationalism is another increasingly prominent feature of Moscow's international posture. After 
having ignored the problem for a long time, the government has at last identified the protection of 
the  Russian-speaking population outside Russia's  borders as  a  priority.182 Yeltsin  refused to 
withdraw troops from Latvia and Estonia until the civil rights of the local Russians were guar-
anteed. Pressure is put on the authorities of the former Asian republics of the USSR to allow dual 
citizenship  and  equal  rights  for  their  Russian  inhabitants.  Various  plans  to  facilitate  the 
resettlement of Russians on Russian  territory are  advanced by the  government (though not 
implemented in the crisis-stricken and chaotic conditions of today). Moscow reacts strongly to 
any signs of anti-Russian feelings in the "near abroad": belittling Russia's past, destruction of 
monuments to Russian heroes etc.183
Attempts are made by the authorities to placate the national feelings of the Russians - through 
historical references and the commemoration of historic dates and great achievements of our 
forerunners. The ethnic self-criticism (in newspapers, on stage, in TV programs etc.) that was 
typical in the "perestroika" period, is almost a  self-imposed taboo now. Instead, newspapers, 
scholars, economists and politicians compete to prove the superiority of the Russians over other 
nations i.e. in the sciences, arts, sports, and even racial or biological characteristics. The tsarist 
era which was castigated under the communist system is now presented as a golden age.184 Even 
the communist epoch is being less criticized lately. Arguments are found to defend Moscow's 
behavior during the Cold War, to justify its policies in Eastern Europe, vis-a-vis China, in the 
field of the arms race etc.
The new attitude is reflected in Moscow's disillusion about the effectiveness and correctness of 
the policy of repentance at large. Yeltsin's advisors have come to realize that self-criticism of the 
Soviet past  does not bring positive results.  Rather  than appreciation Russia's partners show 
disdain and look for vengeance for the crimes of previous Kremlin leaders. In accordance with 
this new approach, Moscow refused to take the blame for the shooting-down of the South Korean 
passenger plane over Sakhalin in 1983. It also refuses to sign agreements with Rumania and 
Hungary which contain any confession of Soviet guilt.  Moscow's invasions of Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia are no longer discussed. Afghanistan is remembered only in the context of fallen 
and wounded Russian soldiers. Their sacrifice is praised. Only on rare occasions does a Russian 
official now agree that the USSR bore responsibility for the Cold War and the arms race.
181 For the discussion of this issue see: Rossiya i SShA..., op. cit., pp. 79-152.
182 Even back in October 1992 Yeltsin seriously criticized the Russian Foreign Ministry and accused it of dis-
playing "the imperial syndrome in reverse", i.e. of being too shy in speaking about national interests in the 
"near abroad" for fear of being accused of "super-power chauvinism" (RIA Novosti, 27 October 1992). Fi-
nally, Foreign Minister Kozyrev started to stress that Russia intended "to strictly uphold the interests of the 
Russian-speaking population and stand up for them wherever they might be". (The Washington Post, 10 Oc-
tober 1993).
183 Ed. A.Shutov, Problemy SNG..., op. cit., pp. 50-60, 92-104; Rossiya i Baltika..., op. cit., pp. 14-18.
184 See, for example, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 16 May 1995; Segodnya, 12 October 1995.
Nationalism is closely connected with the Russian super-power ambitions regarding its foreign 
policy. Russians do not simply want to gain any place under the sun, but a special place. These 
feelings, temporarily lost during the initial chaotic period after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
have resurfaced in the society and are  shaping the Russian foreign policy doctrine.185 Every 
important document, issued by Yeltsin's administration and the Foreign Ministry, contains direct 
or indirect references to the necessity of restoring Russia's super-power status. As the Russian 
Foreign Minister started to say in 1993-1994, "Russia is destined to be a super-power."186
Russia's super-power ambitions are reflected in the growing claims of the Kremlin to play the 
pivotal role throughout the former Soviet Union, to be the arbiter, the policeman and the military, 
political, economic as well as spiritual leader of the vast region.187 In addition to entering the 
exclusive club of "G7", Moscow insists on having its own distinctive position regarding every 
international issue. It refuses to automatically accept Western initiatives as was the case not long 
ago.188 The Kremlin increasingly manifests its inclination to participate in the discussion and 
solution of all major international disputes, be they in the Middle East or in the South Pacific. It 
is eager to show its flag on all  four continents.189 Powerful lobbies - consisting of engineers, 
diplomats,  military officers, scholars,  whose careers had been associated with the allies and 
friends of the USSR - push for the restoration of traditional ties. Their arguments are: "a) we've 
put a lot of effort, money and resources into these regions; b) we've helped to create those regimes 
and we are responsible for their future; c) leaders come and go, but traditional friendships remain 
and d) in our turbulent times, the world situation changes so fast that we might need our former 
allies again".190
185 It is true, however, that various scholars and journalists as well as some government officials continue to argue 
that "for now Russia cannot claim to be a super-power due to its declining economic development and the 
uncertain  and  unstable  situation  in  the  society  as  a  whole".  (Ya.  Plyas,  op.  cit.,  p.  50;  V.  Razuvaev, 
Mezhdunarodnyi faktor v presidentskoi kampanii, in: Segodnya, 29 March 1996).
186 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 January 1994.  In its  discussions  with the West  the Kremlin invariably demands 
conditions "corresponding to the size, importance and capabilities of Russia" (See: Vneshnepoliticheskie pri-
oritety,  Moscow, IAMP, 1996,  p.  23). Security Council  Deputy Secretary Valery Manilov said about the 
newly adopted military doctrine: "The characteristics of Russia as a super-power are that it covers one-sixth of 
the world's land surface and that it is inhabited by a unique Greater Russian multinational people [...] which 
has its own Russian Interests." (As quoted in: D. Simes, op. cit., p. 80).
187 In February 1993, Yeltsin formulated what became known in the West as "the Yeltsin doctrine": Moscow's 
intention to exercise special rights and take on special responsibilities throughout the former Soviet Union 
(New York Times, 1 March 1993). On this subject see also Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 January 1994; The Mos-
cow Times, 20 January 1994.
188 In this context a Western scholar remarked that after 1992 "Russian diplomats and officials from the Foreign 
Ministry  began  to  advocate  Russia's  position  in  various  bilateral  and  multilateral  forums  much  more 
energetically than they had done in 1992. [...] Senior Military figures and the Ministers of Defense, Internal 
Security, and Foreign Intelligence [...] began to articulate more pragmatic and conditional backing for Russia's 
policy regarding the  United States.  Even Kozyrev [...]  began to  tone  down his  enthusiasm for  forging a 
"partnership" with the United States. (Peter Shearman, Russian Policy Toward the United States, op. cit., p. 
128). Even back in the summer of 1992, Kozyrev talked about the necessity for Russia not to follow the lead 
of the West automatically, but "to play solo more often" instead. (See Novoe Vremya, No. 23, 1993).
189 As one Russian political analyst argued, the status of Russia "should be determined by its nuclear and military 
power which is far greater than that of other countries" (Alexander Golz, Russia's Role in Europe, in: The 
Moscow Times, 21 May 1994).  Nowadays,  government officials  state that  the thrust  of Moscow's policy 
should focus on achieving "equality and on the rejection of one-sided concessions by Russia" (Rossiya i 
SShA..., op. cit., pp. 8-9).
190 New Times, No. 36, 1992; Dawid Warszawski, Powrót do Cam Ranh, in: Rzeczpospolita, 25-26 July 1992, p. 
5; Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter, Vol. XIX, No. 415, October-November 1992, p. 21; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 
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Super-power ambitions even take the form of long-forgotten Pan-Slavistic and Orthodox soli-
darity. Many politicians insist on a pro-Serbian policy in the Balkans because Serbs are Orthodox 
Slavs and because tsarist Russia had always defended them. Moscow is not pleased with the 
attempts by the USA and its NATO allies to determine the destiny of the Balkans without 
Russian consent. Moreover, the Kremlin insists on having an independent position even if it does 
agree with the West on certain aspects of the Yugoslavian problem. The restoration of the 
Russian presence in Palestine is justified on the grounds that Russia had a long-standing presence 
there in previous centuries.191
The temptation to retain global involvement is growing under the influence of many former 
friends and clients of the USSR. Most of them, starting with India and including Libya and Cuba, 
need ties with Russia for various strategic, economic and internal political reasons. They warn 
Moscow against "a futile" policy of reliance on the West and urge it to resume the posture of a 
close friend of the developing nations. What impresses the Kremlin even more is that previously 
hostile states like Israel, Saudi Arabia, Oman etc. display an obvious interest in a more stable 
Russian presence in their regions - as an indispensable power-broker in the settlement of disputes 
and (or) as a counter-balance to the excessive influence of the United States.192 This interest is 
reinforced by an added cultural factor: in Syria, for example, many members of the political elite 
were educated in the Soviet Union and some are married to Russian women.
The Russian foreign policy is also strongly determined by economic motives. Russia badly needs 
enormous transfers of know-how and technology, capital, expertise and goods. The government 
realizes that without external aid reforms will not be able to continue. The Kremlin also knows 
that only foreign capital can help create a true market economy in Russia.193 In addition, goods 
from abroad are sought by tens of thousands of traders and millions of consumers (these goods 
range from oranges to advanced computers). The only way to pay for these products and services 
is to export raw materials and finished goods. Finding proper markets for oil, tanks, buses etc. is 
a powerful motive driving Russian diplomacy.194 Moscow sells weapons to its former foe China 
with the same ease as it sells them to potential Chinese adversaries in India and Vietnam. The 
economic damage of withdrawal from the Third World is a popular topic of discussion in the 
Russian capital. Many nations owe Moscow billions of dollars. The only way to make them pay 
their debts, if not now then at least some time in the future, is to restore friendly ties with the 
ruling  regimes of  those countries.  Besides,  trade  and  some forms of  economic cooperation 
between Russia and these countries could be profitable. Economic considerations played a role in 
the reluctance of Moscow to agree to UN-sponsored sanctions against, among other countries, 
Iraq, North Korea and Serbia.
The economic factor, on one hand, pushes Russia to develop close ties with all states. On the 
other hand, the Kremlin believes it has to protect the country and its weak producers from foreign 
competition and to prevent the flight of valuable resources and the export of treasures and other 
items from Russia at low prices.195
191 Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, No. 6, 1995.
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193 Mezhdunarodnye operatsii rossiyskikh bankov, Moscow, Nauchnaya Kniga, 1996, pp. 10, 34-40, 60-65.
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Among other things, ideology also plays a part with regard to Moscow's activities abroad, al-
though the influence of this factor is different from what it used to be back in 1992. At that time, 
as we have already mentioned above, Russian democrats clung to the Western world and hailed 
its values, while denouncing human rights violators and dictators. The ideological love affair 
with the West is no longer dominant. Passion for spreading the democratic gospel has faded.196 
The forces that do not accept Western democratic values are strong again. They are shifting the 
Russian public's focus of attention to opposite models of development: those of China, Chile, 
Singapore or South Korea.197
The government does not object: it shares respect for the achievements of these countries. And it 
certainly feels that Moscow is not in a position to give ideological lessons to others. First of all, 
Russian democracy has to overcome the Chechen crisis, instability and an economic crisis back 
home. Second, the Kremlin would not be supported by its own people. It is not by accident that 
Chinese leaders when visiting Western Europe are confronted by angry human rights activists. In 
Russia Chinese leaders do not have to worry about any protests of this sort. Third, the American 
example is cited: the USA makes friendships and keep them according to its needs - be they 
economic, strategic or  political.  It  continues to  develop relations with authoritarian  oil-rich 
regimes of the Persian Gulf and non-democratic Singapore. But Washington puts pressure on the 
democratic  governments  of  New  Zealand  or  France,  when they  hurt  military,  political  or 
economic interests of the United States.198
Consequently,  Yeltsin prefers the former member of the Brezhnev leadership, Heidar  Aliev, 
much more as a leader of Azerbaijan than his predecessor El-Chibei. Aliev is more or less pro-
Russian, while El-Chibei, for all his democratic and anti-communist rhetoric, proved to be anti-
Russian as he pushed Azerbaijan into the embrace of the Muslim world. In Tajikistan Moscow 
supports those who are loyal, not those who speak favorably of democracy. The same applies to 
Russia's posture regarding Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan and other former republics of the 
USSR. Loyal leaders are needed to defend basic Russian interests in the "near abroad" which are 
often violated by those paying lip-service to democracy or even those who are truly democratic 
minded nationalists.
Thus,  ideology is still  present in  Russian foreign policy:  The country studies various ideas, 
compares them and finds useful aspects not only in Western ideology. At the same time Russian 
diplomacy is growing more and more pragmatic.199 Both, the US and China are considered to be 
important partners, and ideology is not an obstacle to good relations with either. The same goes 
for Germany and Syria, Cuba and France. The intensity of ties with these and other countries is 
determined by many factors, but not by ideological sympathies or antipathies.200
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197 Arkady Volsky,  a  prominent  Russian  politician  representing industrial  circles,  said  in  an interview with 
Newsweek: "Our situation is much closer to the Chinese situation than to the experience of any other country. 
We should study their experience in conducting a land reform, as well as their experience concerning state 
support of the private sector with the help of laws, taxation, investments etc.". (Newsweek, No. 29 1992).
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V. Conclusion
The above-mentioned motives are gradually changing the pattern of the Russian foreign policy, 
its original aims and methods. Some of the changes came as a spontaneous response to the new 
realities inside and outside Russia. Others were sharply contested by various branches of gov-
ernment and individual leaders. Kozyrev for one consistently resisted attempts to move too far 
away from the West and refused to formulate a revised strategy.201
Until now, the new overall strategy has not found its final shape. Yet, it looks like a certain 
consensus in being reached at  least  within the executive branch of the government and the 
democratic and centrist opposition to the government. In essence, its aims are to make Russian 
diplomacy less pro-Western and more balanced, more security-minded, super-power oriented, 
economically-motivated and pragmatic.202 On the basis of the realities inside and outside Russia 
as well as the prevailing opinions of the Russian political and economic elites we may venture to 
predict that the development will continue in the direction of the described policy. The "near 
abroad" will  dominate Russia's diplomatic agenda thus reflecting internal politics203,  the vital 
necessity for integration and the irresistible urge to restore the traditional sphere of influence. The 
road to integration will be a bumpy one due to suspicions of the CIS countries' elites and the 
positions of the West and Southern neighbors of the former Soviet republics.
Bilateral and international differences, especially concerning the expansion of NATO and Rus-
sia's bitterness over the lost super-power status will mar Moscow's partnership with the West. 
However, the partnership will survive.
First, Russia does not have the strength to afford a general confrontation with the major world 
powers. At the moment, its armed forces are no match for the combined military machinery of its 
potential foes. Russia's military system is disorganized and its technology deteriorating. The geo-
strategic position of Russia is even less favorable. The front line has moved from the middle of 
Germany to  the  Russian-Ukrainian  border.  No  government could  dream of confrontational 
policies under such strategic circumstances.
Second, the authorities would have to improve the crisis-stricken Russian economy - both, to 
bolster military strength and to meet the expectations of the tired and disillusioned population. 
This cannot be done without importing technology, capital and management know-how. For this 
reason and also in order to secure the necessary income by exporting raw materials Russia will 
have to keep the doors to the world open and remain flexible in its relations with the most 
developed nations on the planet.
Third, there is basically no major ideological issue which (under any leader) could drive a wedge 
between Russia and the developed countries. Russia has no choice but to strive to build a modern 
society along the lines of Western Europe or America. 
Fourth, the Russian people are fed up with confrontations and wars - even the domestic operation 
against Chechen separatists has not gathered a popular support.
201 Ed. Peter Shearman, Russian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 128.
202 This fact is recognized by many authors. See, for example, Diplomaticheskiy Ezhegodnik, Moscow, op. cit., 
pp. 20, 32-35, 44, 62-66, 101-115. Actually some aspects of the changes in Moscow's strategy concerning 
foreign affairs even suit moderate communists and nationalists: they have supported Russia's entry into the 
European Council, and they agree with Yeltsin's current stand on NATO.
203 A competition has already developed between the pro-communist State Duma and Yeltsin's administration on 
this issue. In the spring of 1996, the Duma terminated the 1991 treaty on the dissolution of the USSR. Yeltsin  
responded by forging the Community of  Belorussia  and  Russia  as  well  as  the "Union of  four": Russia, 
Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan (Izvestiya, 4 April 1996).
Regarding the West, Russia does not pose a strong enough geopolitical challenge to unite the 
Western powers and make them pool their resources against Moscow.
More energetic Russian activities are to be expected in Asia and the Pacific (especially China), in 
the Middle East and South Asia. In most cases the Kremlin will get a positive response from the 
prospective partners. The new (or renewed) Russian friendships will create some anxiety in the 
West  and  inside  the  above-mentioned regions.  For  example,  Japan  might  not  like  further 
rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing, but the misunderstandings and tensions will be 
limited and controllable. Moscow will not sacrifice its relations with the West for its friends in the 
Third World. All in all, Russia will most probably be one of the power centers in the emerging 
multipolar world - no more aggressive or specific in its behavior than others.
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Summary
Introductory Remarks
This report seeks to describe and analyze the Russian foreign policy as it evolved from being 
clearly pro-Western back in 1991-1992  to a  more balanced and nationalistic version by the 
mid-1990s. In addition certain projections for the future are made.
Findings
1. In many ways the foreign policy of the new Russia was a continuation of Gorbachev's "new 
thinking". Gorbachev set the Soviet Union on the path of partnership with the Western alli-
ance by clearing away the military and political legacy of Stalinism-Brezhnevism. This 
strategy enjoyed full support of the democratic movement headed by Yeltsin.
2. After coming to power democrats, however, dissociated themselves from Gorbachev's "new 
thinking". They argued that while Gorbachev had continued "to divide the world into two 
camps", they were about to initiate "a completely fresh policy of unrestrained partnership 
and integration with the West". Indeed, this kind of policy was put into action as the Rus-
sian democrats saw the Western nations as being their chief ideological and political allies, 
the main source of economic aid and a model for Russia's development.
3. The promotion of ties with former Soviet republics - now independent states - became another 
new part of Russian diplomacy. Yeltsin and his entourage believed that the dissolution of 
the USSR and the destruction of communism opened wide vistas for a real friendship and 
fruitful cooperation among new neighbors.
4. Finally, there was a rejection of the communist heritage. Moscow displayed a willingness to 
admit and correct historical misdeeds of the USSR. The democratic government toned 
down its activities in Eastern Europe as well as distanced itself from the remaining commu-
nist regimes and radical Third World friends of the USSR. Neither of them showed much 
enthusiasm for cooperation with the new Russia (for various reasons).
5. With time, a number of internal and external factors started to influence Yeltsin's original 
strategy.  Internally,  failure of "shock therapy" led to the weakening of democrats and 
strengthening of the communists and nationalists. The conservative pressure on the foreign 
policy emanates not only from the opposition but also from inside the reshuffled govern-
ment.
6. Externally, Russia has become disappointed with the behavior of the West: it has failed to be a 
reliable ideological and political ally; the aid is limited; the Western model does not seem 
to work on Russian soil. Relations with the former Soviet republics also proved to be 
thorny. Controversies developed over the Russian diaspora, property division, arbitrary 
borders etc. Due to Russia's retreat from Eastern Europe and other parts of the world, there 
were clear losses i.e. economic, geopolitical, cultural and also in prestige.
7. Yeltsin's and Kozyrev's foreign policy became the target of criticism, which grew into a full-
scale national debate. The debaters split into four major camps. The first, consisting of 
Westernizers, continues to defend basic aspects of the initial strategy. The opposite camp 
considers the West to be an eternal enemy of Russia and proposes to counter the alleged 
Western threat through alliances - with the CIS countries, Iran or China. There are also 
those, who see enemies of Russia throughout the world. They call for a comprehensive de-
fense of the Motherland. The fourth camp, uniting many democrats and centrists, suggests 
a more balanced world strategy, open and cooperative, but without a pro-Western "tilt". As 
for the Russian public, its views are in flux and unstable. In general, the public still follows 
the political leaders' opinions (as has been a long-standing tradition).
8. As a result of the internal and external influences and specifically the national debates the 
initial motives of the new Russia's foreign policy are being gradually modified. Russia 
again puts an emphasis on security, strong armed forces, foreign intelligence and forging 
strategic partnerships in various regions. Nationalism finds an expression in the protection 
of the Russian diaspora, glorification of the Russian imperial past and scaling down the 
policy of repentance for the misdeeds of the Communist regime. Russia's super-power 
ambitions can be observed in its growing claims to playing the pivotal role throughout the 
former Soviet Union, to enter the exclusive club of "G7", to show the Russian flag on all 
four continents. Democratic ideas do not influence the Kremlin's relations with other states 
anymore, while economic interests encourage Moscow to restore cooperation with many 
Third World nations.
9. The revised overall strategy of Russia has not yet taken its final shape. However, a certain 
consensus seems to be forming within the society. Its essence is to make Russian diplomacy 
less  pro-Western  and  more  balanced,  more  security-minded,  super-power  oriented,  eco-
nomically-motivated and pragmatic. The "near  abroad" will  dominate Russia's diplomatic 
agenda, but the road to any kind of integration will be a bumpy one. Bilateral and interna-
tional differences will mar Moscow's partnership with the West. However, the partnership will 
survive. Both sides neither have sufficient reasons nor the means to return to the collision 
course. At the same time, one can expect a more energetic Russian drive in Asia and the 
Pacific, in the Middle East and South Asia. All in all, Russia will most probably be one of the 
power centers in the emerging multipolar world, no more aggressive or specific in its behavior 
than others.
